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In this paper, we have examined the impact of tax cut on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southeast Asian countries as 
a response to the debatable issue of the relationship between 
tax cut policy and FDI. We use corruption perception index and 
government effectiveness as the control variable, as well as 
other economic and demographic variables such as GDP 
growth, tax revenue, inflation, unemployment and population 
growth. Using Fixed Effect Model on panel data for a period of 
1997-2016 adopted from World Bank, UNCTAD, and various 
websites, our findings suggest that in Southeast Asian 
countries, even though corporate tax cut policy gives a 
negative effect on FDI, this tax cut policy is not the main factor 
that induce investors. It is trade openness and GDP growth 
which become the reasons for investors to invest in this region. 
Moreover, the effect of government performance has played 
pivotal role in attracting FDI inflows. 
Dalam paper ini, kami meneliti pengaruh pemotongan tarif 
pajak terhadap Investasi Modal Asing/Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) di negara-negara Asia Tenggara sebagai 
respon atas perdebatan para ekonom atas hubungan 
kebijakan pajak dengan FDI. Dalam paper ini, kami 
menggunakan persepsi tingkat korupsi suatu negara dan 
efektifitas pemerintah sebagai variable kontrol untuk 
melengkapi variabel ekonomi dan variable demografi, seperti 
pertumbuhan GDP, penerimaan pajak, inflasi, pengangguran 
dan pertumbuhan penduduk. Dengan menggunakan panel 
data Fixed Effect Model untuk kurun waktu 1997-2016 yang 
diadopsi dari Bank Dunia dan UNCTAD, hasil studi ini 
menyimpulkan bahwa di negara-negara Asia Tenggara, 
pemotongan tarif pajak memberikan kontraksi terhadap 
pertumbuhan FDI. Di kawasan ini, keterbukaan perdagangan 
dan pertumbuhan GDP merupakan faktor pendorong 
masuknya investor asing, dimana efektifitas pemerintah 
sebagai motor utamanya. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Currently, countries are competing to each 
other on attracting the investors. Governments have 
introduced several policy instruments to get as much 
investments as possible to their own country. The 
foreign investors are the main target of these specific 
instruments because the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflow to the host country is empirically proven 
to give positive impact to its economic performance. 
However, to induce foreign investors to invest in the 
host country is for sure challenging. Those investors 
determine whether to invest or not by having some sort 
of things to consider, one of them is the tax rate of the 
host country. 
The impact of taxation on investment has been 
hotly debated both in academic and political circles. 
First group of economists believe that corporate tax 
cut will increase investments. Ferede & Dahlby (2012) 
suggested that tax cut can reduce the capital cost and 
raise incentives to invest. However, the second group 
argues that corporate tax cut in today’s economy 
will have no significant consequence on investment. 
This group believes that the resultant of the risen of 
economic concentration in today’s economy is the key 
part of this insignificant effect of corporate tax cut. 
Even though the role of tax is still the subject to 
discussion among scholars, but this tax scheme still 
plays a pivotal role to attract the foreign investors. For 
many cases, the corporate tax rate of the host country is 
one of the main considerations for the foreign investors 
to invest. To respond this issue, many host countries 
set their corporate tax rate lower than others.  They 
expect positive economic growth from the increasing 
investments as the impact of tax cut policy (Ferede & 
Dahlby, 2012). This policy is commonly applied if the 
main goal is to attract FDI and to lower the distortions 
that hold back the level of domestic investment as well. 
Such tax scheme, however, may affect the 
economic performance of one country differently due 
to its economic size (Winner, 2005). Using Generalized 
Method Moment (GMM) Model, Winner (2005) 
studied the impact of tax regime on the large and small 
economy. Out of 23 OECD countries during 1965 – 2000 
period, he found that larger economies enjoy positive 
impact of tax policy through the escalating value of 
capital accumulation. In contrast, for small economies, 
the tax regime induces tax competition and may 
degrade the value of capital inflow.
The role of taxes, through the tax rate in determining 
the FDI inflow depends on its type (Jayasuriya, 2011). 
However, it is the corporate income tax that has been 
widely investigated by most scholars (i.e. Abdioglu, 
Binis, & Arslan, 2016; Becker, Fuest, & Riedel, 2012; 
Egger & Raff, 2015; Jayasuriya, 2011)and--if so--how 
they react to changes in other countries’ tax rates and 
bases. Specifically, we estimate the slopes of tax policy 
reaction functions and examine how marginal changes 
in trade costs and GDP affect tax policies in the Nash 
equilibrium. The estimated slopes and comparative 
static effects can be rationalized in a model in which 
governments compete for foreign direct investment 
(FDI. Focusing on corporate tax cut, Becker et al. (2012) 
investigate the effect of tax cut on FDI in 22 European 
countries. Using Fixed Effect Model for the period of 
2000 to 2006, they conclude that tax rate positively 
affects the quantity of capital stock.  
Considering European countries as large economy, 
we move our attention to the small economy. Southeast 
Asian countries is a group of country worth to study 
in this objective. This group has been experiencing 
corporate tax rate reduction for the last twenty years. 
In fact, this is the only region where almost all of its 
members apply such policy. Historically, the first country 
to have corporate tax cut was Malaysia and Philippine 
in 1998. Malaysia’s corporate tax rate was reduced 
from 30% to 28%, while Philippine reduced from 35% 
to 34%.  Singapore is considered as the most often one 
to reduce its corporate tax rate, from 26% in 2001 up to 
17% in 2010. In 2008, Indonesia, and Vietnam reduced 
their corporate tax rate as well. Indonesia’s corporate 
tax rate was degraded from 30% to 25%, while Vietnam 
had reduced their corporate tax rate several times 
from 35% to 20% in 2016. Thailand and Laos were the 
last countries to reduce the rate of their corporate tax 
rate in 2012 from 30% to 20%, and from 35 % to 24% 
respectively. The summary data can be seen in figure 1.
It seems that the effect of tax cut regime in 
this area follow the conclusion of Winner (2005) in 
which tax cut leads to tax competition among small 
economies that may distort economic performance. 
In addition, for countries where tax revenue as the 
primary source of national income, tax cut will likely 
create more budgetary deficit and higher interest rate 
that will affect both investment, and economic growth 
negatively (Zidar, 2015). In that case, Southeast Asian 
countries are part of this tax dependent group with the 
average tax revenue to GDP ratio in 2016 is more than 
11%, for example Indonesia (10,3%), Malaysia (14,2%), 
Singapore (14,3%), Philippines (13,7%) and Thailand 
(15,7%). Due to that reason, the influence of corporate 
tax cut on FDI in Southeast Asian countries is interesting 
to be discussed.
From the aforementioned importance of tax cut on 
FDI and due to the little agreement among economists 
on the effect of tax cut and FDI, in this paper we will 
discuss the issue of how corporate tax cut affect the FDI 
in Southeast Asian countries. We have mentioned some 
articles about the effect of tax cut on FDI, however, 
this topic has rarely been discussed in Southeast 
Asian countries. Focusing on corporate tax cut, how 
much does this fiscal policy affect the investment 
in Southeast Asian countries? To fill the gap of the 
previous researchers, we will use more contemporary 
data to better illustrate the effect of tax cut on FDI in 
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current years in this area.
This paper will use data from 1997 to 2016, when 
most countries in this region have started to implement 
the corporate tax cut policy. We will use the ratio of FDI 
to GDP as the dependent variable, and corporate tax 
cut as our interested independent variables. We will 
also estimate the effect of tax revenue, GDP growth, 
inflation, unemployment, and population growth as 
independent variables to FDI. In addition, to have a 
better estimation result, we use Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), and Government Effectiveness (GE) as 
control variables. 
In this study, Southeast Asian countries will be 
grouped into two groups. One group is the countries 
that have already implemented tax cut policy, while 
the other group is the countries with no tax cut policy 
experience. The first group is our main objective. 
Moreover, in the regression data, we will run our data 
twice for each group based on the type of government 
performance. Firstly, we will run our data using CPI as 
the control variable, and secondly, we will use GE. We 
need to treat these two variables differently since they 
may give distinct effect on our dependent variable.
Expanding the previous studies of the effect of 
taxes on FDI in the large economies, this study will give 
a wider view of the effect of tax cut on FDI in the small 
economies using the most recent datasets. Moreover, 
this study also gives a different perspective of how 
institutions performance of one country may also alter 
the effect of this fiscal instrument. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
OECD defines FDI as a cross-border investment 
where an investor from one country establishes a 
long-term interest in and/or a substantial degree of 
influence over a company in another country. The 
flow of FDI is motivated by three reasons, which are 
ownership-specific aspects based on its tangible and 
intangible assets; internalization aspects because of its 
value-added control in multiple location and countries; 
and location-specific aspects, resulting from the local 
endowments, economic situations and government 
policies, such as investment and tax regulation, 
intellectual property protection, and labor regulation 
(Baccini, Li, & Mirkina, 2014). In this matter, taxes may 
influence all those three types of aspects for taxes are 
imposed in all those three in the name of property tax, 
value-added tax and income tax. Therefore, the role of 
taxes become more pronounce to the flow of capital as 
they reduce the net returns to any investors.
Generally, the role of taxes on determining FDI 
inflow can be viewed under two aspects, which are 
the economic factors and institutional factors. While 
as economic factors, tax determines the flow of FDI 
through its rate, as institutional factors, it affects FDI 
inflows via its administrative obligations. Both aspects 
show their impact on FDI inflows through cost and 
productivity as it is the basic element for investors to 
consider before they decide to invest (Krugman et al., 
2012). Thus, for countries to induce more investment, 
the economic and institutional reform is vital. 
The influence of corporate reform on the economy 
will be determined by how the reform affects decisions 
to increase investment by adding the capital stock. The 
decisions to invest are based on the investor’s expected 
return on investment, specifically the after-tax return. 
The investors will take into account all the tax effects 
on income, not only the individual income taxes, but 
also the corporate tax.  This corporate tax system will 
influence net corporate profits, which affect investors’ 
future wealth and returns from the investments (Auten, 
Carroll, & Gee, 2008). Thus, tax system strongly affects 
investment.
Furthermore, investment is affected by taxes 
through their impacts on factor of accumulation 
and total factor of productivity (Ferede & Dahlby, 
2012). Focusing on the factor accumulation, the cost 
of capital will be raised by implementing taxes, and 
reduce the incentives to invest. Thus, higher tax rates 
will dismay investment. Moreover, Auten et al., (2008) 
suggested that in the corporate sector, high tax rates 
tend to discourage investment and will probably lead 
to several economic distortions. Thus, taxes can twist 
capital allocation and reduce the productivity of overall 
investment. 
In addition, tax cut policy will increase investment, 
especially FDI (Devereux & Griffith, 2002). In order to 
foster FDI, both developed and developing countries 
set fiscal incentives especially tax instruments, such as 
tax holidays, tax amnesty, tax exemptions and tax cut. 
Corporate tax cut is the one that has been the 
most popular instrument in international platform to 
induce foreign investors. Consequently, the race-to-
the-bottom trend has been emerged. Moreover, since 
countries tax regimes are influenced by the integration 
of international tax in which one country may set its 
tax policies as a response to its neighbor countries tax 
policies, international tax competition has shown its 
existence (Heinemann, Overesch, & Rincke, 2010).  
2.1. FDI determinants
Scholars have been examined the determinants 
of FDI for many years, however there are still no 
consensus among them all. This means that there is 
no general acceptance of the explanatory variables 
that can be rewarded as the “true” determinants of 
FDI (Kok & Ersoy, 2009). For this study, we will use the 
determinants of FDI as follows:
	‒ Corporate Tax Rate (TAX):  It is the rate of corporate 
tax in the countries. 
	‒ Tax Revenue (REV): It defines as the total tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP. 
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	‒ GDP Growth (GDP): It indicates the annual growth 
rate of GDP.
	‒ Openness (OPEN): It is the trade ratio (export and 
imports ratio) to GDP.
	‒ Population growth (POP): It illustrates the growth 
rate of midyear population from year t-1 to t. 
	‒ Inflation (INF): It shows the Consumer Prices Index 
annual growth rates. It captures the lack of monetary 
control within a country.
	‒ Unemployment (UNEMP): It refers to the labor force 
proportion that is with no work but available for and 
seeking employment (World Bank definition). 
	‒ Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): It defines as the 
private’s benefit gained from the misemployment of 
public power. 
	‒ Government Effectiveness (GE): It is the perception 
of the quality of government’s commitment to apply 
effective policies in public services, and civil services. 
2.2. Empirical Overview
Countries’ fiscal policies are determined by the 
capital volatility and the openness of their economy 
(Ghinamo, Panteghini, & Revelli, 2010). Investigating 
the impact of tax rate, the credibility of government 
and the flow of capital, Ghinamo, Panteghini, & Revelli 
(2010) found that the government’s credibility is the 
main driver of capital flow. Low credibility leads to 
capital outflow because it puts the investment at high 
risk. Consequently, tax cut policy is introduced that aims 
to counter the possible income shifting opportunities. 
The previous studies conducted to assess the 
effect of this corporate tax cut on FDI concluded that 
FDI is positively correlated with corporate tax cut (i.e. 
Djankov et al., 2009). Egger & Raff (2015)and--if so-
-how they react to changes in other countries’ tax 
rates and bases. Specifically, we estimate the slopes 
of tax policy reaction functions and examine how 
marginal changes in trade costs and GDP affect tax 
policies in the Nash equilibrium. The estimated slopes 
and comparative static effects can be rationalized in a 
model in which governments compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI analyze the effect of corporate tax cut 
on FDI inflows in 43 developed and emerging countries 
over the period 1982-2005. The results conclude that 
degradation of the FDI tend to affects the reduction in 
corporate tax rates significantly.
Abdioglu, Binis, & Arslan (2016) focus on the 
impact of tax policies on FDI in OECD countries. They 
group the countries between countries with tax cut 
policy and those who don’t. They examine the relation 
between those two group of countries over the sets of 
time-series analysis. Their results show that taxes have 
a significant impact on FDI. In addition, they find that 
tax policies have various impact on FDI across countries 
in which high tax rates and FDI have a negative 
relationship. 
2.3. Hypotheses
Corporate tax rate is likely to give negative effect 
on FDI because high corporate tax will give disincentive 
to invest. Abdioglu et al., (2016); Egger & Raff (2015)
and--if so--how they react to changes in other countries’ 
tax rates and bases. Specifically, we estimate the slopes 
of tax policy reaction functions and examine how 
marginal changes in trade costs and GDP affect tax 
policies in the Nash equilibrium. The estimated slopes 
and comparative static effects can be rationalized in a 
model in which governments compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI report that tax cut attracts foreign 
investors, thus, FDI inflows will have positive trend. In 
contrast, tax revenue positively affects FDI. Gropp & 
Kosital (2000) find a positive correlation between FDI 
and tax revenue. This is due to the increasing of the 
domestic capital stock as the impact of FDI inflows.
GDP growth plays an essential role on attracting 
FDI. When foreign investors relocate their investment, 
they take into account the prospects of growth of the 
host country (Morrissey and Rai, 1995). Even though 
some studies find a positive relation between GDP 
growth and FDI (i.e. Abdioglu et al., 2016; Egger & Raff, 
2015)and--if so--how they react to changes in other 
countries’ tax rates and bases. Specifically, we estimate 
the slopes of tax policy reaction functions and examine 
how marginal changes in trade costs and GDP affect tax 
policies in the Nash equilibrium. The estimated slopes 
and comparative static effects can be rationalized in a 
model in which governments compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI, there is another part of the literature 
that counter this view. For example, Nigh (1985) finds 
that economic growth and FDI have a negatively weak 
relation.
Investors require the stability of monetary 
condition to invest. Since inflation captures the lack 
of monetary control within a country, many literatures 
find a negative relation between FDI and inflation 
(Demirhan & Masca, 2008; Kok & Ersoy, 2009). In 
contrast, the openness (trade ratio) likely gives positive 
effect to FDI. Edwards (1990)a key question is how to 
improve the LLCs attractiveness for foreign capital 
flows. In this paper I explore the role of two potential 
sour of additional private capital inflows: increased 
direct foreign investment, and the debt-conversion 
mechanisms. The paper presents the results from 
an economic analysis of the determinants of the 
cross-country distribution of the OECD direct foreign 
investment (DFI finds that openness results to a positive 
trend on FDI. 
Population size indicates the market size. 
Population should give positive effect on FDI because 
when the market is increasing in size, FDI will follow 
the trend (Kristjánsdóttir, 2005). On the other hand, 
unemployment indicates economic instability. Botric, 
V., and Skuflic (2006) find that unemployment rate 
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affects FDI negatively. 
Both CPI and GE indicate the government 
performance and represent the quality of countries 
political condition. Boţa-Avram (2013) finds that 
corruption control and government effectiveness have 
positive impact on investment. 
3. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3.1. Data Sources
The data used in this paper were obtained from 
various sources. Data of FDI (US$, current prices) 
and export-import data (US$, current prices) were 
obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). We accessed the data from 
website at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. For data 
of corporate tax rate (%), we use data from https://
tradingeconomics.com/ as well as data from Ministry 
of Finance and Bureau of Statistics website of each 
observed Southeast Asian Countries. For CPI (index, max 
100), were obtained from transparency international 
website at https://www.transparency.org/. As for GE 
(index, range (-2,5 to 2,5)), the data were accessed from 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/. Other variables 
data of GDP (PPP, constant 2010 US$), tax revenue (% 
GDP), population growth (%), unemployment (% labor 
market), inflation (%) were derived from World Bank 
website at https://data.worldbank.org/.  
This study uses panel data which is the combination 
of cross section data and time series data. Time series 
data covers data of 1997 to 2016, across 10 Southeast 
Asia countries. To have a more homogenous panel data, 
we will divide our analysis into two sub-panels based 
on the corporate tax cut variables, which are:
1) Countries with tax rate cut: consisting of Indonesia 
(IDN), Laos (LAO), Malaysia (MYS), Philippines (PHL), 
Singapore (SGP), Thailand (THA), and Vietnam 
(VNM);
2) Countries with no tax rate cut: consisting of Brunei 
Darussalam (BDN), Cambodia (KHE), and Myanmar 
(MMR). 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the information of corporate tax 
rate of Southeast Asian countries from 1997 to 2016. 
It shows the changes of corporate tax rate in most 
countries in the region. Philippine, and Malaysia were 
the first country to reduce its corporate tax rate in 
1998. It soon followed by other countries: Vietnam in 
2000, Singapore in 2001, Indonesia in 2009, and lastly 
Thailand and Laos in 2012. In addition, some of these 
countries even reduce their corporate tax rate more 
than once such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
Only three countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
and Myanmar) that have not reduced their corporate 
income tax. We can see that the average of corporate 
tax rate in Southeast Asian countries has been reduced 
significantly from 28,45% in the early 2000’s to become 
22,35% in end of 2016. Among these countries, 
Singapore becomes the one with the lowest corporate 
tax rate, while Philippine is the highest one.
Figure 2 presents the trend of FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP between countries with corporate 
tax cut and countries with no corporate tax cut. Even 
though the trend fluctuates over time, but we can see 
that on average, FDI inflows have a positive trend in the 
span of twenty years since the first time this corporate 
tax cut has been implemented. The biggest jump was in 
2006 and 2007 where the policy has been implemented 
for more than 5 years with at least 4 countries reduced 
their corporate tax rate. On the other hand, even 
without corporate tax cut policy, the other countries 
still managed to have positive growth of FDI inflows. 
Even in the period of 2011-2013, they had bigger FDI 
ratio to GDP than the other countries with tax cut 
policy. However, the competitor countries took over 
the lead again ever since. For the past two years, the 
FDI inflows have declined considerably for both groups.
Descriptive statistics average value, and deviation 
standard of variation for all variables used in this study 
are displayed in Table 2. The ratio of FDI to GDP is seen to 
be the highest in Singapore with average 15,9% among 
the group of TAX cut countries, while Indonesia is the 
lowest with only 0,96%. Meanwhile, for the period of 
20 years back, Laos is having the highest GDP growth 
for average of 7,06% per year, while Thailand has the 
slowest growth with 3,14% per year. As for tax revenue 
ratio to GDP, Vietnam has the highest percentage with 
19,74%, while Indonesia has the lowest percentage 
with 11,72%. On the other hand, for openness ratio, 
Singapore become the most open country with 3,215 
times GDP, while Indonesia seems to be the least 
open one with 0,339 ratio to GDP. As far as the ratio to 
GDP from those variables is concerned, it seems that 
Singapore has the best ratio out of other countries, 
while Indonesia seems to be lowest.
Focusing on population growth, for average, 
Singapore has the highest growth with 2,2%, while 
Thailand has the slowest growth with only 0,7%. As for 
unemployment rate, Indonesia has the highest number 
with 5,83% on average, while Thailand has the lowest 
rate at 1,38%. It seems that in these demographic 
objective variables, Thailand has the best performance 
among other countries.
On the other hand, Laos becomes the highest 
average inflation country with 18,25%, while Singapore 
has the lowest one with 1,5%. Meanwhile, for CPI, and 
GE, Singapore has shown a magnificent performance 
by leading the group with average index 90,35 and 
2,14 respectively. For these fields, Laos becomes the 
lowest country with average index 21,75 and -0,822 
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respectively. As far as the government performance 
is concerned, it is clearly seen that Singapore has the 
lead, while Laos is the poorest.
For no TAX cut countries, for the period of twenty 
years back, on average, Brunei Darussalam is leading 
in the most objective variables by being the best 
government performance, both in CPI and GE. It has 
also the lowest inflation rate (0,46%), and the highest 
tax revenue ratio to GDP (31,2%). However, it has the 
lowest FDI ratio to GDP (1,9%), the lowest GDP growth 
(0,74%), and also has the highest unemployment 
rate (4,31%) among the three countries. Meanwhile, 
Cambodia has the lead in FDI inflows (7,4%), openness 
ratio (1,084), and has the highest population growth 
(1,8%). Although Myanmar seems to be the poorest 
government performance by having the lowest index in 
both CPI, and GE, it has the highest GDP growth (9,91%), 
and the lowest percentage of population growth (0,9%) 
and unemployment (1,46%) among other countries in 
this group.
Comparing the data of TAX cut countries, and No 
TAX cut countries, on average, we can see that the first 
group has lower tax rate than the second group. The 
first group has higher ratio of FDI inflows, openness 
ratio, and government performance as well. However, 
the second group is having higher GDP growth, and 
lower unemployment rate than the first group.
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1. Empirical Model
In this discussion, we define FDI as the net inflows 
in the observed economy from foreign investors divided 
by GDP. For the specification of the empirical model, 
we refer to the study conducted by Abdioglu, Binis, and 
Arslan (2016) with some modification and adding new 
explanatory variables.
We use the following model to estimate our 
hypothesis:
lnFDIc,t = a0 +  a1 lnTAXc,t +  a2 Xc,t +  YD +  εc,t     
With this model, we will test our hypothesis for the 
period 1997-2016 in Southeast Asian countries. FDI as 
the dependent variable is the FDI inflows as a percentage 
of GDP to a country (c) at time t. TAX as our primary 
independent variable is corporate tax rate in each 
country at time t. We introduce X as variables vector that 
are effectively influence FDI inflows. These variables are 
annual growth rate of GDP, ratio of tax revenue to GDP, 
annual rate of inflation, rate of unemployment, growth 
of population, and the openness of the economy, 
corruption index and government effectiveness index. 
We define YD as the year dummies set. a0 is the 
constant intercept parameter estimation, α1 represents 
the slope of interest parameter estimates, a2 represents 
the slope of other control variables parameter, while ε
c,t
 
represent the error term. From this model, we expect 
the coefficient α1 to be negative as a confirmation to 
our hypothesis. 
Data of FDI inflows to GDP, tax rate, tax revenue 
to GDP, openness ratio, population rate, CPI, and 
GE is measured in the form of growth because these 
variables are not stationary in level. GDP growth and 
inflation does not need to be changed because they 
have already been stationary at its level. We determine 
those variables by using unit root test with Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF). We applied the test in the form of 
the level variables to test the null hypothesis that panel 
data is not stationary. This test is needed to determine 
which variables are supposed to be changed before fit 
in into model in the form of growth, and which are in 
the form of level.
4.2. Estimation Method
In this study, panel data will be used as estimation 
method. Panel data will result more information, 
greater degree of freedom, more variability, and will 
be more efficient. Using this panel data, there are three 
approaches when we start the analysis, which are least 
square approach (Pooled Least Square (PLS)), fixed 
effect approach (FE), and random effect approach (RE). 
Pooled Data approach assumes that α (intercepts) and 
the residuals are constants across individual and over 
time. In fixed effect approach, variations of individual are 
captured in the α
ct
 (intercepts) over time. Meanwhile, 
in random effect approach, variations of individual and 
times are accommodated in the residuals. 
In order to get the most suitable approach, we 
run our data using the three of those approaches. First 
step, we run our data using PLS. Next, we run both FE 
and RE panel regression to test our model. After that, 
we use Chow test to determine which one is better 
between PLS and FE. If the P value of FE is less than 
5% alpha, then the PLS is rejected, thus, we choose FE 
instead of PLS. Since FE is chosen, we apply Hausman 
test to determine whether to use FE or RE in our model. 
If the difference in the coefficients is not systematic or 
simply the null of Hausman test is rejected, then we use 
FE model to test our hypothesis. In addition, we also 
run other statistical test, which are heteroskedastic, 
and autocorrelation test.
5. RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION
5.1. Model Validation
To get a valid model, we have to apply some tests, 
which are unit root test (stationary test), and Hausman 
test. Firstly, we test the stationary of our data using ADF 
tests. The purpose of this test is to know which variable 
should be treated as growth form or level form. The test 
is applied to level form variables, with assumption that 
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the Null hypotheses is non-stationary in the panel data. 
From this stationary test, we found that GDP growth, 
and inflation is stationary in level form. So, those two 
variables can fit to the model with no form change. 
Meanwhile, other variables, namely FDI Inflows, Tax 
rate, tax revenue, population, openness ratio, CPI, and 
GE are not stationary at level. Thus, these variables 
should be transformed into the form of growth.
Secondly, after knowing the variables form, we 
need to apply Hausman test. Hausman test (1978) is 
used to examine the inconsistencies in the estimation, 
between fixed effect, and random effect by comparing 
the slope parameter in both approaches. From the test 
results, Fixed Effect Model (FEM) is the best model to 
be applied in our study. With this result, the assumption 
that there is no relationship between independent 
variables and the error, is satisfied. Moreover, based 
on autocorrelation test, we find that there is no 
autocorrelation within the variables in our model. The 
heteroskedastic issue in our model is treated using 
variance-covariance estimate (vce), and then we get 
the robust result.
5.2. Estimation Results
We apply the estimation model to various data 
combination to estimate the data from TAX cut 
countries using FEM, and then we compare the results 
and determine which model is the most suitable 
to our study. From table 3, in result 1 to 3, tax rate 
gives negative impact to FDI inflows, which means 
that the tax cut policy positively correlated with FDI 
inflows.  However, this tax rate effect disappears once 
openness, CPI, and GE is controlled. When we add year 
dummy to the model (result 5 and 6), the tax rate effect 
shows different sign from the earlier result. Since result 
5 gives the highest R2 (0.7360), we will use this result 
to analyze our objective study. Having determine the 
model for TAX cut countries, then we will compare that 
result with the result from No TAX cut countries as seen 
in table 4. We do this comparison to better illustrate 
the importance our objective determinants of FDI. 
For the first result, when the CPI is controlled, in 
the countries with tax cut policy, FDI inflows is positively 
affected by tax rate with the parameter significance 
level of 10%.  GDP growth, unemployment, and CPI 
give positive effect to FDI Inflow with 1% significance 
level, while the positive impact of openness is at 5% 
significance level. On the other hand, tax revenue, 
population and inflation do not give (significant) 
effect on FDI inflows. In this model, the coefficient of 
determination (R2) is 0.7360. It means that the overall 
independent variables were able to explain the variation 
of FDI inflows by 73.6% during the period of study. The 
remaining 26.4% is explained by other variables not 
included in the estimation model. Furthermore, if we 
take a look at the F-statistic value of 23.25 which is 
significant at 99% confidence level or α = 1%, it means 
that simultaneously all independent variables jointly 
affect the variation of FDI Inflows. 
In this model, CPI has the biggest coefficient value 
of 5.0975 in affecting FDI inflows. It could be explained 
that when the corruption control is increase by 1 point, 
the FDI inflows will likely increase by nearly 5,1%. On the 
other word, the less corrupt the country, the more they 
get FDI. This result is in line with the study conducted by 
Boţa-Avram (2013). He found that corruption control 
has positive impact on investment. Tax rate has the 
second biggest coefficient value to affect FDI inflows 
with 1,9979. It means that when tax rate is set higher 
by 1%, then the FDI inflows will increase nearly 2% as 
well. This result contradicts with the study conducted 
by Abdioglu et al., (2016), and Egger & Raff (2015). 
However, even though it is not significant, the result 
on tax revenue effect on FDI inflows fits the findings 
of Gropp & Kosital (2000) that FDI and tax revenue is 
positively correlated.
Furthermore, the increase in openness by 1% 
contributes to higher FDI inflows 0.91%. This result is in 
line with Edwards (1990) findings that openness results 
to a positive trend on FDI. The impact of the increase 
of unemployment rate to the increase FDI inflows does 
not support Botric, V., and Skuflic (2006) findings of 
negative effect of unemployment rate to FDI. Finally, 
GDP growth seems to be the most dominant factor 
in affecting FDI inflows. Even though the coefficient 
value is only 0.1162, but since it is in the level form, 
we may interpret that the increase in GDP growth 
by 1% contributes to higher 11% on FDI Inflows. This 
result supports the studies conducted by Abdioglu et 
al., (2016), and Egger & Raff (2015).
For the second result, when the GE is controlled, 
in the countries with tax cut policy, even though the 
sign is positive, tax rate seems to be not affecting the 
FDI Inflows since the parameter is not significant.  GDP 
growth remains to give positive effect to FDI Inflow 
with 1% significance level, while unemployment, and 
openness positively affect FDI Inflows at 5% significance 
level. Other variables (tax revenue, population, inflation, 
and GE) do not give (significant) effect on FDI inflows. 
In this model, the coefficient of determination (R2) is 
0.3922. The F-statistic value of 7.83, and significant at 
99% confidence level. Comparing this second result 
with the first one, we may see that by having CPI as 
control variable, we get better result because the R2 is 
higher than the second result. 
When we control GE as government performance 
indicator, tax rate is no longer give effect to FDI inflows. 
Surprisingly, GE is not giving a significant effect as well. 
Here, openness has the biggest coefficient value with 
1.3491, followed by unemployment (0.8417), and GDP 
growth (0.1360). Those three variables correlate to 
FDI inflows positively. The difference between the first 
result and the second result is only on the significance 
level for each variable, while all variables in both results 
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show consistent coefficient signs.
For the No TAX cut countries, when we control 
CPI, tax rate gives positive effect to FDI Inflows at 10% 
significance level, the same with population. Openness 
gives positive effect with 1% significant level. On the 
other hand, other variables do not have (significant) 
impact on FDI Inflows. In this model, the coefficient of 
determination (R2) is 0.5459. The F-statistic value of 
6.68, and significant at 99% confidence level. 
In this first result, aside of tax rate, openness is 
the most dominant factor to increase FDI inflows with 
1.4213 coefficient value, which simply mean that when 
openness increased by 1%, the FDI inflows will follow 
by increasing 1,4%. Different with the TAX change 
countries, here, population give positive impact to 
FDI inflows with 1.5051 coefficient value. It supports 
the theory from Kristjánsdóttir (2005) saying that 
population should give positive effect on FDI because 
when the market is increasing in size, FDI will follow the 
trend. Surprisingly, the result shows that CPI does not 
affect FDI, although the sign is negative. 
For the second result, when we control GE, tax 
rate remains to give positive effect to FDI Inflows at 
10% significance level the same with openness and 
inflation. With this model, population gives the biggest 
positive effect with 1% significant level, while GE has 
positive effect with 5% significance level. On the other 
hand, other variables (GDP growth, tax revenue, and 
unemployment) do not have (significant) impact on FDI 
Inflows. In this model, the coefficient of determination 
(R2) is 0.8530. It means that the overall independent 
variables were able to explain the variation of FDI 
inflows by 85.3% during the period of study. The 
F-statistic value of 19.34 which is significant at 99% 
confidence level or α = 1%, it means that simultaneously 
all independent variables jointly affect the variation of 
FDI Inflows. Comparing this second result with the first 
one, we may see that by having GE as control variable, 
we get better result because the R2 is higher than the 
first result. 
In this second result, population is the biggest 
factor to affect FDI with 1.3285 coefficient value, 
followed by openness (0.7855), GE (-0.5652) and 
inflation (0.0318). The result on GE is contradicts 
with the study conducted by Boţa-Avram (2013). This 
negative sign may lead to a harsh suggestion that when 
the government is poorly manage the country, the 
more investors eager to invest. 
5.3. Intercepts Interpretation
The interpretation of the intercepts for each 
country is seen on table 5. Intercept values of each 
individual show that FDI inflows in each country are 
different. From the FEM estimation result, the country 
that is potentially having the highest the FDI inflows 
growth is Laos, followed by Vietnam, and Thailand. 
While Singapore could potentially get the lowest FDI 
inflows growth compare to other countries.
The differences in the growth FDI inflows among 
these observed countries are due to the difference in 
the characteristics of each country. For a country where 
previously has low FDI, once they have better economic 
performance such as higher GDP growth, and more 
open in term of trade, and also have an improvement 
in government performance such as higher index of CPI 
and GE, it will likely induce more investors to invest in 
their country. It is experienced by Vietnam currently. 
In the early observed period (1997), Vietnam is 
still struggling in managing their domestic issue. The 
CPI was low (28) which means a moderate corrupt 
country, and the GE index was -0,35 or simply inefficient 
government. At that time, the FDI inflow was US$ 2.2 
billion. However, since the last ten years, Vietnam’s 
performance has gradually increase both in GE and 
CPI. In 2016 CPI and GE index was 35, and 0.01, which 
means a massive improvement. With average 6.04% 
GDP growth for the last ten years, and supported by 
more efficient government, Vietnam is now becoming 
one of the most promising market in Asia (IMF report). 
FDI inflows in 2016 was reported US$ 12.6 billion, 
increased 567.67% from 1997. Thus, if the trend is still 
continuing, we may see a better Vietnam in the term of 
FDI inflows in the future. 
5.4. Discussion
As our main interest variables, tax rate policy 
is empirically proven to increase the FDI inflows in 
Southeast Asian region. However, on average, the 
sign is not consistent with other study (i.e. Abdioglu 
et al., (2016), and Egger & Raff (2015)). We find that 
tax rate is positively correlated with FDI inflows, that 
when the rate is reduced, FDI inflows will decrease as 
well. However, the effect of this tax rate policy is not 
strong enough. Investors consider other factors when 
they have to determine whether to invest or not. This 
finding may be resulted from the tax competition in the 
area as well as the China Effect. Since most countries 
in this area implement a relatively similar fiscal 
instrument, investors look to other market that provide 
bigger investment returns. At the same time, we see 
in this study period, China has a flourishing economic 
performance which indeed give negative sentiment for 
other developing countries.
In this area, for the past twenty years, openness 
ratio becomes the most important factors to induce 
investors in all countries in the region. The more open 
the country, the higher the possibility for them to get 
FDI inflows. This positive result is in line with Edwards 
(1990) study. This openness effect may be due to the 
prospect of larger market, and potential to market 
expansion.
GDP growth has been one of the most dominant 
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factors in affecting FDI inflows for the countries with 
tax cut policy. At average, the increase in GDP growth 
by 1% contributes to higher 11% on FDI Inflows. This 
result supports the studies conducted by Abdioglu et 
al., (2016), and Egger & Raff (2015). Higher GDP growth 
will give certainty of higher return on investment, thus 
the investor would invest more. However, this case 
does not occur in the countries with no tax cut policy. 
In these countries, the economic growth is not always 
the case to lure investors. The biggest issue may be the 
government performance.
The government performance is pivotal to attract 
investor. However, our result suggests a distinctive 
result in both groups. While for countries with tax cut 
policy, the less corrupt they are, investors will invest 
more. In contrast, in the countries with no tax cut 
policy, where the efficiency of government increase, 
the investors tend to reduce the investment. The latter 
result opposes the findings by Boţa-Avram (2013) 
study. But, the importance of institutions seems to be 
undeniably essential for investors in these two groups. 
It is due to the fact that in this area, the security of 
investment is still questionable since during the last 
few decades many of these countries has experienced 
political turmoil which in turn holdbacks the flow of 
investment.
In addition, in the countries with tax cut policy, 
unemployment will potentially increase the rate of 
FDI inflows. This result does not support Botric, V., and 
Skuflic (2006) suggestion. It may be due to the labor 
force supply, and the tendency of low wage of these 
labors. On the other hand, it is the population rate 
that gives significantly positive effect on FDI inflow for 
countries with no tax cut policy. As what Kristjánsdóttir 
(2005) suggested that population represents market 
size, thus, the higher it is, more investors will come. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we examine the determinant of FDI 
inflows in Southeast Asian countries, with the effect 
of tax cut policy as our main interest. We conduct 
the study using data from 1997-2016, where most of 
countries in the region start to apply the corporate tax 
cut policy.
Our results confirm that in Southeast Asian 
countries, tax policy has a weak role in inducing FDI 
inflows. In this area, it is the institutional aspect that 
matters the most to attract the foreign investors. 
Even though many countries construct a relatively 
radical fiscal policy by having continuously tax rate 
reduction which in turn leads to tax competition in 
the region, it is the institutional reform that drive the 
flow of investment to the countries. As a result, since 
the country becomes more expose to international 
trade thanks to institutional reformation, the foreign 
investments follow. 
GDP growth and trade openness are the two main 
drivers of FDI inflows in the region. When the country 
become more secure for investments, economic 
prospect, which is indicated by GDP growth and trade 
openness, then upsurge the investment flow.
 From the study period and based on the economic 
and institutional aspects, we see that Vietnam was 
the winner in this so-called tax competition. The main 
reason was because it uses both fiscal policy and the 
institutional reform to invite foreign investments. The 
increase in government performance which indicates 
the security for investment then give higher return to 
Vietnam than the loss of its national income from the 
tax cut policy.
7. SUGGESTIONS
Through this study, we find the impact of tax cut 
on FDI inflows in Southeast Asian region. Thus, we may 
suggest some alternative policies for the policy makers 
to pursue higher FDI inward, such as:
1) Reducing tax rate is not going to give positive effect 
on inducing foreign investors in the long run. It 
only has temporary effect on FDI inflows. Since 
neighborhood countries are also implementing 
the same tax policy, it is better for each country to 
focus on improving government performance. Less 
corruption and more effective government will give 
significant effect on attracting investors.
2) Since openness ratio is one of the most dominant 
determinants of FDI, then countries in the Southeast 
Asia should increase the trade volume among 
themselves. With this strategy, not only FDI inflows 
will increase but also the total productivity.
3) As for further study, it is better to have a disaggregate 
FDI data to examine which sectors will be more 
responsive to the change of tax rate. By having this 
particular study, it may come up to some policy 
recommendation.
REFERENCES
Abdioglu, N., Binis, M., & Arslan, M. (2016). The Effect of 
Corporate Tax Rate on Foreign Direct Investment: 
A Panel Study for OECD Countries. Ege Academic 
Review, 16(4), 599–610.
Auten, G., Carroll, R., & Gee, G. (2008). The 2001 
and 2003 Tax Rate Reductions: An Overview 
and Estimate of the Taxable Income Response. 
National Tax Journal, 61(3), 345--364. https://doi.
org/10.17310/ntj.2008.3.01
Baccini, L., Li, Q., & Mirkina, I. (2014). CORPORATE 
TAX CUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Leonardo Baccini, Quan Li, and Irina Mirkina, 
33(4), 977–1006. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam
Becker, J., Fuest, C., & Riedel, N. (2012). Corporate tax 
effects on the quality and quantity of FDI. European 
INFO ARTHA, Volume 4 No. 01 (2020), 13 - 27
Page 22
Economic Review, 56(8), 1495–1511. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.001
Boţa-Avram, C. (2013). Empirical Analysis of Effects of 
Country-level Governance to Strength of Investor 
Protection. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 99(2012), 1063–1072. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.10.580
Botric, V., and Skuflic, L. (2006). Main Determinants 
of Foreign Direct Investment in the Southeast 
European Countries. Transition Studies Review, 
13(2), 359–377. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-
006-0110-3
Demirhan, E., & Masca, M. (2008). Determinants of 
foreign direct investment flows to developing 
countries: a cross-sectional analysis. Prague 
Economic Papers, 17(4), 356–369. https://doi.
org/10.18267/j.pep.337
Devereux, M. P., & Griffith, R. (2002). The impact of 
corporate taxation on the location of capital : A 
review. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 9, 79–
102.
Djankov S., Ganser T., Mcliesh C., R. R. and S. A. (2009). 
The effect of corporate taxes on investment 
and entrepreneurship. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 56(4), 113–124. https://doi.
org/10.1257/mac.2.3.31
Edwards, S. (1990). Capital Flows, Foreign Direct 
Investment, and Debt-Equity Swaps in Developing 
Countries. NBER Workng Paper, (3497), 1–44. 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w3497
Egger, P., & Raff, H. (2015). Tax rate and tax base 
competition for foreign direct investment. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 22(5), 777–
810. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9305-4
Ferede, E., & Dahlby, B. (2012). the Impact of Tax Cuts 
on Economic Growth: Evidence From the Canadian 
Provinces. National Tax Journal, 65(3), 563–594. 
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2012.3.03
Ghinamo, M., Panteghini, P. M., & Revelli, F. (2010). FDI 
determination and corporate tax competition in 
a volatile world. International Tax Public Finance, 
17, 532–555. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-
009-9127-y
Gropp, R., & Kosital, K. (2000). The Disappearing Tax 
Base: Is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Eroding 
Corporate Income Taxes. IMF Working Paper, (10), 
38. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00173.pdf
Heinemann, F., Overesch, M., & Rincke, J. (2010). 
Rate-Cutting Tax Reforms and Corporate Tax 
Compeittion in Europe. Economics and Politics, 
22(3), 498–518. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0343.2010.00375.x
Jayasuriya, D. (2011). Improvements in the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings: Do they Translate 
into Greater Foreign Direct Investment Inflows? 
Policy Research Working Paper, 5787(September).
Kok, R., & Ersoy, B. A. (2009). Analyses of FDI determinants 
in developing countries. International Journal of 
Social Economics, 36(1/2), 105–123. https://doi.
org/10.1108/03068290910921226
Kristjánsdóttir, H. (2005). Determinants of foreign direct 
investment in Iceland. University of Copenhagen. 
Retrieved from http://www.econ.ku.dk/cam/
wp0910/wp0406/2005-15.pdf/
Krugman, P. R., Obstfled, M., & Melitz, M. J. (2012). 
International Economics.
Morrissey, O., & Y. R. (1995). The GATT Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Measures: Implications 
for Developing Countries and their Relationship 
with Transnational Corporations. Journal of 
Development Studies, 31(5), 702–724.
Nigh, D. (1985). The Effect of Political Events on United 
States Direct Foreign Investment: A Pooled 
Time-series Cross-sectional Analysis. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 16, 1–17. https://
doi.org/10.3102/00346543067001043
Winner, H. (2005). Has Tax Competition Emerged in 
OECD Countries ? International Tax and Public 
Finance, 12, 667–687.
Zidar, O. M. (2015). Tax Cuts For Whom? Heterogeneous 
Effects Of Income Tax Changes On Growth And 
Employment. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, (March), 1–53. https://doi.org/10.3386/
w21035
THE IMPACT OF TAX CUT ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A CASE STUDY IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
Page 23
Rusman Affandi Nasution
ILLUSTRATION TABLES
Table.1. Corporate Income Tax Rates
Year BRN IDN KHM LAO MYS MMR PHL SGP THA VNM
1997 18,5 30 20 35 30 25 35 26 30 35
1998 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 34 26 30 35
1999 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 33 26 30 35
2000 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 26 30 33
2001 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 25 30 32
2002 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 24 30 32
2003 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 22 30 32
2004 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 22 30 28
2005 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 32 22 30 28
2006 18,5 30 20 35 28 25 35 22 30 28
2007 18,5 30 20 35 27 25 35 22 30 28
2008 18,5 30 20 35 26 25 35 18 30 28
2009 18,5 28 20 35 25 25 30 18 30 25
2010 18,5 25 20 35 25 25 30 17 30 25
2011 18,5 25 20 35 25 25 30 17 30 25
2012 18,5 25 20 28 25 25 30 17 23 25
2013 18,5 25 20 24 25 25 30 17 20 25
2014 18,5 25 20 24 25 25 30 17 20 22
2015 18,5 25 20 24 24 25 30 17 20 22
2016 18,5 25 20 24 24 25 30 17 20 20
Source: Author’s Compilation
Table.2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
TAX Cut Countries No TAX Cut Countries
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
FDI 140 4,554 5,712 60 3,858 3,771
TAX 140 29,9857 4,9457 60 21,1667 2,8023
GDP 140 5,0365 3,3525 60 6,1313 4,7703
REV 140 14,4246 2,8745 60 14,9175 12,2885
POP 140 1,52 0,76 60 1,48 0,52
OPEN 140 1,1811 0,9817 60 0,7382 0,4275
UNEMP 140 3,4071 2,1317 60 2,7305 1,9873
INF 140 6,5444 15,0456 60 7,7325 12,5347
CPI 140 39,69 22,68 60 30,56 16,48
GE 140 0,2847 0,9381 60 -1,1412 0,2936
  Notes: N: number of observation; Mean : average; Std. Dev: standard deviation
Table 3. Estimation Result for TAX Cut Countries
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Variables
TAX Cut Countries
FDI
1 2 3 4 5 6
ln_TAX -2.842*** -3.168*** -3.060*** -0.0021 1.9979* 1.5842
(0.8301) (0.8947) (0.8928) (1.1633) (1.0696) (1.269)
GDP 0.1681*** 0.1726*** 0.1634*** 0.1289*** 0.1162*** 0.1360***
(0.0356) (0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0356) (0.0303) (0.0358)
ln_REV 1.6142 1.7234 2.2664 0.7524 1.0875 1.3005
(1.1069) (1.1126) (1.1618) (1.1715) (0.9968) (1.160)
ln_POP 0.0521 0.0496 0.0560 0.0299 0.0703 0.0275
(0.1598) (0.1599) (0.1591) (0.1513) (0.1269) (0.1480)
ln_UNEMP 0.3177 0.4154 0.6199* 0.8008*** 0.8417**
(0.3246) (0.3290) (0.3170) (0.2788) (0.3317)
INF -0.0142 -0.0101 -0.0054 -0.0111
(0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0087)
ln_OPEN 1.9482*** 0.9183** 1.3491**
(0.5066) (0.4582) (0.5462)
ln_CPI 5.0975***
(0.7608)
ln_GE 1.4219
(2.0134)
Year 0.7257*** 0.9001***
0.2853 0.3316
Cons. -1.2854 -1.0459 -2.6949 -7.3901* -9.3583** -16.610***
4.2223 4.2302 4.3422 4.3011 (4.3547) (5.8071)
R-squared 0.5621 0.5654 0.5733 0.6181 0.7360 0.6419
F-statistic 16.56 15.14 14.22 15.69 23.05 14.82
Prob
(F-statistic)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 140 140 140 140 140 140
    ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Table 4. Estimation Result for comparison
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Variables
                    TAX Cut Countries                 No TAX Cut Countries
FDI Prob. FDI Prob. FDI Prob. FDI
ln_TAX 1.9979* 0.064 1.5842 0.215 9.200* 0.085 4.1582*
 (1.0696)  (1.269)  (5.2329)  (2.1879)
GDP 0.1162*** 0.000 0.1360*** 0.000 0.0481 0.278 -0.1245
 (0.0303)  (0.0358)  (0.0438)  (0.0975)
ln_REV 1.0875 0.277 1.3005 0.265 0.8611 0.270 0.6029
 (0.9968)  (1.160)  (0.7724)  (0.3877)
ln_POP 0.0703 0.580 0.0275 0.853 1.5051* 0.058 1.3285***
 (0.1269)  (0.1480)  (0.7754)  (0.4292)
ln_OPEN 0.9183** 0.047 1.3491** 0.015 1.4213*** 0.008 0.7855*
 (0.4582)  (0.5462)  (0.5130)  (0.3927)
ln_UNEMP 0.8008*** 0.005 0.8417** 0.012 -0.1535 0.467 -0.0923
 (0.2788)  (0.3317)  (0.2095)  (0.0956)
INF -0.0054 0.469 -0.0111 0.207 0.0473 0.145 0.0318*
 (0.0075)  (0.0087)  (0.3192)  (0.0167)
ln_CPI 5.0975*** 0.000 -1.0168 0.313  
 (0.7608)  (0.9985)   
ln_GE   1.4219 0.481   -0.5652**
   (2.0134)    (0.2404)
Cons. -9.3583** 0.034  -15.583*** 0.008 -28.0019 0.079* -10.8753
 (4.3547)   (5.8071)  (15.6037)  (6.0337)
R-squared 0.7360  0.6419  0.5459  0.8530
F-statistic 23.25  14.82  6.68  19.34
Prob (F-sta-
tistic)
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
N 140  140  60  60
Notes: TAX Cut countries using FE; No TAX cut countries using PLS,
( ) in the bracket is standard error
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 5. Individual intercept result
Fixed Effect (Cross) Intercept
Malaysia -2.1998
Philippine 0.7258
Singapore -3.7602
Thailand 1.0536
Vietnam 1.6122
Laos 3.3131
Note: Indonesia as the based country (0)
Source : Author calculation
Table 6. Unit Root Test
Variable
ADF-Fisher
Chi-square
Statistic Probability
FDI 28.8586 0.0109
TAX 4.52339 0.9207
GDP 64.4827 0.0000
REV 33.4689 0.0025
POP 19.7342 0.1387
OPEN 10.6741 0.7114
UNEMP 34.2890 0.0019
INF 52.5715 0.0000
CPI 0.0109 0.6201
GE 17.7995 0.2161
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Figure 1. Corporate Tax Rate Reduction in Southeast Asian Countries
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Figure 2. FDI inflow as percentage of GDP: Comparison between two sub-panel countries
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